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Abstract. Borrowers’ participation in MFI group lending credit market is not insured 
because of the alternative sources of credit available. The question arises what is the ideal 
MFI interest rate to ensure borrowers’ participation which at the same time being 
financially viable for MFI. The paper attempts to answer this question and analyzes the 
borrowers’ trade-off of borrowing from MFI or from moneylender (ML). Results show that 
borrowers may find comparative advantage in borrowing individually from ML as 
compared to borrowing in a group from MFI if the transaction cost burden is high and their 
credit requirement is low. 
Keywords. Microfinance, Group lending, Informal finance, Transaction cost, Effective 
cost. 
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1. Introduction 
he concept of microfinance and group lending was popularized by the 
Grameen Bank of Bangladesh in response to the problems faced by poor 
and marginal borrowers who are in need for small credit and who are unable 
to pledge any collateral to secure credit. Under a typical Grameen Bank lending 
contract, lending happens in groups with joint liability, regular repayment schedule 
and dynamic incentive clause. This model proved to be very successful as shown 
by repayment rates of over 95% (Besley & Coate, 1995). The success of 
microfinance group lending has led to an extensive and growing literature on the 
subject. The models of Stiglitz (1990), Besley & Coate (1995), Ghatak (1999) , 
Aghion (1999) and Aghion & Gollier (2000) show how Grameen type group 
lending with joint liability helps to mitigate the effect of information asymmetry 
between the lender and the borrower by exploiting the local information about the 
borrowers. This is made possible through borrowers’ participation in group 
formation, peer monitoring, and imposing social sanctions on the defaulting 
borrowers, among others. 
Notwithstanding the extensive and still growing literature on microfinance and 
group lending, most theoretical literature has approached the group based lending 
from the lenders’ perspective. It shows how group lending contracts with joint 
liability help to solve lenders’ agency problems like adverse selection, ex-ante 
moral hazard and ex-post moral hazard. On the other hand, the borrowers’ 
perspective considers the additional burden to the borrowers in the form of 
transaction costs when borrowing happens in a typical group lending contract with 
joint liability and regular repayment schedule. Transaction costs include the 
opportunity cost of attending weekly repayment meetings, cost of travelling to 
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attend meetings, cost of monitoring the group member etc. The problem of 
borrowers’ transaction costs in group lending has been discussed by Chung (1995), 
Bhatt & Tang (1998) (who term these costs as ‘hidden beasts’), Pal (2002), 
Karduck & Seibel (2004), Dehem & Hudon (2013), among others. However there 
is very limited theoretical literature which has explicitly incorporated this 
information in the MFI’s decision framework. 
Against this background, we attempt to provide a theoretical framework around 
the borrowers’ trade-off of group borrowing from MFI versus individual borrowing 
from ML when both MFI and ML co-exist in the credit market and when both are 
equally competent to meet the borrowers’ funding requirements. We assume that 
borrowing from MFI comes at lower interest cost but with the additional 
transaction cost while borrowing from ML comes at higher interest cost without 
incurring any transaction cost. 
We solve the MFI’s optimization problem (profit maximization) considering 
borrowers’ participation constraint and repayment feasibility constraint to produce 
threshold or optimum MFI interest rate. The threshold MFI interest rate is 
interpreted as the maximum rate which an MFI can charge to ensure borrowers’ 
participation in the group lending contract while at the same time maximizing its 
profits. To extend this further, we perform numerical simulations. The parameter 
estimates to perform simulations are taken from transaction cost estimation studies 
done in the Indian context, primarily Karduck & Seibel (2004), Shankar (2007) and 
Dehem & Hudon (2013). 
Results show that the increased transaction cost burden negatively impacts poor 
and marginal borrowers who are believed to have lower credit requirement. It 
posits the possibility of poor and marginal borrowers being excluded from the MFI 
credit market even if it does not require them to offer any collateral as in the other 
sources of financing from the formal sector. This also partly explains the relative 
stable dependence of borrowers’ funding requirements on ML as observed in many 
developing countries.  
The paper contains six sections. This introductory section talks about the 
objective and also gives a brief mention of results. Section 2 talks about the MFI 
group lending contract and ML individual lending contract. It sets up the 
expressions for expected utility function of representative borrower when she 
borrows from MFI and when she borrows from ML. Section 3 lists some of the 
necessary assumptions deployed to derive optimum MFI interest rate. Section 4 
solves the MFI’s optimization problem by maximizing its profit function subject to 
borrowers’ participation constraint and repayment feasibility constraint. The 
solution to MFI’s optimization problem results in threshold/optimum MFI interest 
rate. Also, it lists some of the parameter restrictions and the results on comparative 
statics. The next section presents the simulation results performed on optimum MFI 
interest rate. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. MFI and ML contracts 
We assume there are two borrowers and are considering of investing in a 
project. They do not have initial wealth and hence cannot offer any collateral. 
Therefore, the borrowers are credit rationed from commercial banking sources. 
They have a choice of borrowing from MFI as a group (group of 2 people) or 
borrowing from ML individually.  The interest rate charged by MFI is lower than 
that of ML. However, there are additional costs that the members have to bear 
when they borrow from MFI. This includes costs associated with joint liability, 
transaction costs like weekly repayment, monitoring the other member, opportunity 
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cost of time to attend weekly meeting, among others. There is no additional burden 
in the form of transaction cost when borrowing happens from ML.  
It is assumed that there is an indivisible project which requires an investment of 
amount K (K > 0) at the beginning of period 1. The indivisibility of the project 
implies project will not produce any returns when there is an investment of amount 
lower than K. When successful, it will realize positive returns of amount Y at the 
end of period 2. The probability of project being successful (generating sufficiently 
high returns to repay MFI and ML) is p, where p (0,1) . Returns realized Y 
depends upon the ability factor α and amount borrowed K (Gine, 2011). The ability 
factor α (α > 0) presents the ability of the individual borrower to convert capital 
invested into successful realization of returns. A representative borrower requires a 
loan of amount K at the beginning of period 1.  
Case I: When borrower partners with the other borrower and takes a group loan 
from MFI 
 Borrower forms a group with the other member and takes a joint or group 
loan of amount 2K from MFI at an interest rate of r in the beginning of period 1. 
Borrowers divide the loan equally and invest in the project individually.  
 The representative borrower needs to repay some amount, s,  to MFI with 
interest r (r > 0) as an installment at the end of period 1, and the remaining (K - s) 
with interest at the end of period 2 (Jain & Mansuri, 2003). MFI is assumed to 
charge interest rate on flat rate basis, implies fixed proportion of the amount 
borrowed. 
 Since returns are only realized at the end of period 2, therefore she needs to 
borrow from ML to repay the MFI installment at the end of period 1. It is assumed 
that among the informal sources of lending, moneylenders constitute the largest 
share (Pradhan, 2013). Suppose ML gives loans at an interest rate of m (m > 0), 
where m > r.  The borrower borrows an amount of  s 1 r from ML at the end of 
period 1 and needs to repay an amount of   s 1 r 1 m  to ML at the end of 
period 2.  
 The amount due to MFI at the end of period 2 for the individual borrower 
reduces to  (K s) 1 r  .  
 When both the borrower and her partner are successful (happens with 
probability
2p ), there is no joint liability payment. However, when one partner is 
unsuccessful while the other borrower is successful (happens with probability p*(1-
p)), the successful member needs to repay an additional amount of  (K s) 1 r 
to MFI on behalf of her unsuccessful peer. This is because the MFI offers loans 
involving dynamic incentive clause, implies future loans are made only when 
current dues are fully paid.  
 There are fixed transaction costs Tc (Tc> 0) involved when borrower 
borrows from MFI. Tc is transaction cost burden per member.  
The expected utility function of each borrower takes the following form: 
 
 
2
cMFI
c
EU Y s(1 r)(1 m) (K s)(1 r) T p
Y s(1 r)(1 m) 2(K s)(1 r) T p(1 p)
       
        
   
 
Assuming Y= αK (Gine, 2011), the above expression is re-written as: 
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 
 
2
cMFI
c
EU K s(1 r)(1 m) (K s)(1 r) T p
K s(1 r)(1 m) 2(K s)(1 r) T p(1 p)
        
         
              (1) 
 
The first expression inside square bracket denotes the case when both members 
in the group are successful (happens with probability
2p ), and hence there is no 
joint liability payment. The second expression represents the case when the 
representative borrower is successful while her peer is unsuccessful (which 
happens with probability p*(1-p)) and involves an extra joint liability cost of 
(K s)(1 r)   at the end of period 2. Joint liability share is assumed to be 100 
percent (Aghion,1999; Aghion & Gollier, 2000) and project returns (when 
successfully realized) are assumed to be sufficiently high. 
Case II: When borrower borrows from ML 
 A representative borrower borrows individually an amount of K at an 
interest rate of m in the beginning of period 1.  
 The borrower needs to repay K with interest at the end of period 2.  
 As in the MFI case, p is the probability of successful return realization. 
The expected utility in this case takes the following form: 
 MLEU K K(1 m) p                                        (2) 
As in the MFI case, Y is assumed to be equal to αK. 
 
3. Some Assumptions 
We deploy some of the assumptions in an attempt to analyze group lending 
contracts from the borrowers’ perspective while at the same time keeping MFI’s 
group lending contracts financially viable. Borrowers are assumed to be risk-
neutral and identical (Stiglitz, 1990; Ghatak, 1999), however their projects returns 
are not correlated. Probability of success (p) is assumed to be same for both 
borrowers by the positive assortative matching argument put forth in Ghatak 
(1999). It is assumed that borrowers have limited options in terms of number of 
projects and, hence the opportunity cost of putting effort is assumed to be zero.  
MFI is assumed to be profit maximizer (Jain, 1999; Aghion, 1999), while ML is 
assumed to break even (Gine, 2011). Additionally, MFI is assumed to be profit 
maximizer period by period which implies repayments happen with interest both at 
the end of first and second period. It is assumed that MFI and ML are in direct 
competition with each other and are equally competent to meet borrowers’ capital 
requirement. Also, borrowers’ outside options in terms of competing MFIs are 
assumed to be limited (Field & Pande, 2008). We have assumed perfectly elastic 
supply of loanable funds to refrain from the possibility of any equilibrium credit 
rationing (Ghatak, 1999). The cost of funds is assumed to be negligible for both 
MFI and ML (Aghion, 1999). 
The assumptions of positive assortative matching (Ghatak, 1999) and MFI’s 
observability over the borrowers’ capital requirement (Gine, 2011) ensure there is 
no adverse selection problem. The assumptions on ML being the principal source 
of lending among informal sources (Pradhan, 2013), borrowers’ inability to offer 
any collateral (Bose, 1998), and no compulsory savings deposits in case of MFI 
borrowing (Pal, 2002) cumulatively imply borrowers have to take recourse to ML 
to repay MFI installments. Since ML is assumed to enjoy better monitoring 
capabilities and lend only when borrowers invest in safe projects (Jain & Mansuri, 
2003), this ensures there is no ex-ante moral hazard problem for the MFI. The 
assumption of negligible enforcement costs ensures borrowers cannot engage in 
strategic default and implies there is no ex-post moral hazard problem (Ghatak, 
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1999).  These assumptions imply MFI is aware of borrowers’ characteristics like 
probability of project being successful, borrowers’ transaction cost and their ability 
to produce returns through ML involvement.  
 
4. Solving for threshold/optimum MFI interest rate 
The MFI profit function takes the following form: 
 
 22 s(1 r) 1 (1 p) (K s)(1 r) K                              (3) 
 
The first term, s(1+r) , represents the amount of first installment at the end of 
period 1 which is received with full certainty, because of borrowing from ML. The 
second term, (K - s)(1+r) , is the remaining amount to be received from borrower at 
the end of second period provided returns are realized successfully for at least one 
member (happens with probability of [1-(1-p)
2
]. The third term, K, is the amount of 
funds lent. Since there are two borrowers in the group, hence the three terms are 
multiplied by 2. 
To solve for the threshold MFI interest rate or the optimum MFI interest rate r 
at which the representative borrower becomes indifferent between borrowing from 
MFI versus from ML, the expected utility functions, EUMFI and EUML are equated. 
Also, while determining the optimum interest rate, MFI needs to ensure that 
repayment is feasible. Therefore, the MFI’s optimization problem is solved subject 
to the following two constraints: 
 Borrower’s participation/indifference constraint which ensures that 
borrower is indifferent between borrowing from MFI and ML i.e. 
MFI MLEU EU or, 
   
 
2
c cK s(1 r)(1 m) (K s)(1 r) T p K s(1 r)(1 m) 2(K s)(1 r) T p(1 p)
K K(1 m) p
                 
   
 
  cK (1 r)(p 2) (1 m) s(1 r)(p m 1) T 0         
  
(4)  
 Repayment feasibility constraint which implies that returns (when 
successfully realized) are high enough to repay MFI and ML i.e. 
 
Y s(1 r)(1 m) 2(K s)(1 r)       
 
The first term on the right side of the inequality s(1+r)(1+m) represents the 
payment due to ML and the second term (K-s)(1+r) is the payment due to MFI at 
the end of period 2. The second term is multiplied by 2 because of the assumption 
of full joint liability. 
Putting Y=αK, the repayment feasibility inequality is re-written as: 
 
K s(1 r)(1 m) 2K(1 r) 2s(1 r)        ,or 
 K 2(1 r) s(1 r)(1 m) 0           (5) 
 
MFI will maximize its profit function π and determines optimum interest rate r* 
and optimum installment amount s* subject to the borrower’s indifference 
constraintand the repayment feasibility constraint. The MFI’s optimization problem 
is written as: 
Max r,s  22 s(1 r) 1 (1 p) (K s)(1 r) K            subject to: 
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  cK (1 r)(p 2) (1 m) s(1 r)(p m 1) T 0            
 K 2(1 r) s(1 r)(1 m) 0       
 
The optimum r* and s* are as follows: 
 
  c(p m 1)K (1 m) (1 m)T
r r*
pK(1 m)
     
 

   
                     (6) 
c
c
K (p 2) 2K(1 m) 2T
s s* K
K (p m 1) (1 m)K(1 m) (1 m)T
     
   
        
              (7) 
 
Proof: See Appendix 1 
The r* obtained can be interpreted as the threshold MFI interest rate at which 
borrower is indifferent between borrowing from MFI and from ML while 
maximizing MFI’s profits. For any r greater than r*, the expected utility of 
borrowing from MFI will become lower than the expected utility of borrowing 
from ML and the opposite holds true in the case of r being lower than r* i.e. 
 
EUMFI> EUML if r < r*        (8) 
EUMFI< EUML if r > r*       (9) 
 
Therefore, r* can also be interpreted as the maximum interest rate that an MFI 
can charge to ensure borrowers’ participation ( MFI MLEU EU ) in the MFI credit 
market. The r* and s* obtained can also take negative values under some parameter 
combinations. Therefore, for r*, s* to be positive and satisfying the conditions of 
r* m  (Jain and Mansuri, 2003; Gine, 2011) and s* K  (Jain and Mansuri, 
2003), the following restrictions are imposed upon parameters m, p, α, K andTc: 
 
1. p(1 m) 1   
2. p(1 m)(2 p) 2   , m 1  
3.   c(p m 1)K (1 m) (1 m)T       
4.   c(p m 1)K (1 m) mpK(1 m) (1 m)T         
5. 
 
c
K (p 2) 2(1 m)
T
2
   
  
6. (1 m)    
7. 
2(1 m)
(2 p)

 

 
8. K, m, α, Tc all > 0 
9. p (0,1)  
 
Proof: See Appendix 2 
The parameter restriction of p(1+m) > 1 ensures p to be sufficiently high (> 1/2) 
when ML interest rate is less than 100%. This is in consonance with some of the 
empirical studies like Ahmed (1989) and Pradhan (2013). Ahmed (1989) gave 
empirical evidence of ML interest rate of nearly 40% in Bangladesh while Pradhan 
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(2013) showed empirical evidence of ML interest rate of around 25-30% on an 
average in the Indian context. The parameter restriction 2 ensures borrowers’ 
participation constraint to be binding in the MFI’s optimization problem. 
Conditions 1 and 2 are derived from the assumption of MFI being profit maximizer 
and determine its optimum interest rate considering both borrowers’ participation 
constraint and repayment feasibility constraint. The inequalities in 3 and 4 are 
expected to hold true when K is sufficiently high relative to transaction cost, Tc and 
α is sufficiently high relative to per unit cost of borrowing from ML (1+ m). 
Similarly, Condition 5 is derived to satisfy the requirement of MFI interest rate to 
be lower than ML interest rate in conjunction with the requirement of maximum 
installment size of K.Restrictions on ability factor (conditions 6, 7), α ensures 
expected utility of borrowing from ML and transaction costsare positive. The last 
two conditions, 8 and 9, ensure meaningful values of all the parameters.  
The parameter restrictions listed above help to determine how the threshold 
MFI interest rate r* changes when there is a marginal change in one of the 
parameter, keeping other parameters constant. We derive the following lemmas: 
Lemma 1: With the increase in amount borrowed K, threshold interest rate r* 
also increases when p is sufficiently high (p > 1/2).  
Lemma 2: r* falls with the increase in transaction costs Tc when p > 1/2. 
Lemma 3: With the increase in ability factor α, threshold interest rate r* 
increases. 
Lemma 4: There is a positive relation between p and r*. 
Lemma 5: The relation between ML interest rate m and threshold interest rate r* 
is ambiguous. 
Proof: See Appendix 3 
The above lemmas establish that threshold MFI interest rate r* increases with 
the amount borrowed K, probability of successful return realization p, and the 
ability factor α, keeping other parameters constant. With the increase in transaction 
cost, threshold MFI interest rate goes down to keep the borrower indifferent 
between borrowing from MFI and from ML. The comparative statics results are 
largely dependent on the threshold level of probability of 1/2. This indicates the 
possibility of having one member’s project as successful out of the two member 
group. With the assumption of full joint liability and project returns (when 
successful) being sufficiently high, the repayment to MFI happens with full 
certainty if at least one member’s project is successful. An interesting case is of 
lemma 5 wherein the relation between r* and m could be positive or negative. At 
lower values of m the relationship is expected to be positive, however after a 
particular threshold of m, the relationship becomes negative. This is explained 
better with the help of numerical simulations in next section. 
 
5. Simulation results on threshold MFI interest rate 
We perform simulations on the threshold MFI interest rate, changing one of the 
parameters among p, α, K, m and Tc while keeping others at some constant value. 
The range of parameter estimates are taken from Karduck & Seibel (2004), 
Banerjee & Duflo (2010), Dehem & Hudon (2013), Pradhan (2013) and Ahlin 
(2013). In particular, we consider K to vary between 3800 and 6800, Tc to vary 
between 150 and 400, and m to vary between 0.2 and 0.6. The estimates on the 
ability factor and probability of successful return realization are limited. The 
estimates around marginal productivity of capital (MPK) are taken as a proxy for 
the ability factor (α). Banerjee & Duflo (2010) peg the MPK estimates at 75%-90% 
of net and gross returns respectively while Ahlin (2013) in his simulation study use 
a wider range of 60%-100%. Since we have made the assumption of ML borrowing 
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to repay MFI installments and ML is expected to have better monitoring 
capabilities, hence borrowers are expected to invest in projects having higher 
probability of success. In consonance with Banerjee & Duflo (2010) and Ahlin 
(2013), we use α range of (1.6, 2) and p range of (0.5, 0.99). We review the 
simulation results below. The graphs below put threshold MFI interest rate on Y-
axis and the parameter considered on X-axis. 
We consider five cases in total described in Table 1 and 2. These five cases are 
shown in figures 1 till 5. We fix four parameters at a time and change any one of 
the parameters among m, K, Tc, p and α. This is shown under header Fixed 
(parameters fixed at a particular value) and Variable (parameter changing value in 
a continuous range) in the tables below. We consider four to six parameter 
combination values for each case. 
 
Table 1. Parameter combinations considered in simulation results  
Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 
Fixed Variable Fixed Variable Fixed Variable 
p, α, K, Tc m (0.2, 0.6) m, α, K, Tc p (0.5, 0.99) m, p, K, Tc α (1.6, 2) 
a) K = 3900, Tc = 350, p = 
0.85, α = 1.7 
a) K = 3900, Tc = 350, m = 
0.3, α = 1.7 
a) K = 3900, Tc = 350, m = 
0.3, p = 0.85 
b) K = 3900, Tc = 290, p = 
0.85, α = 1.7 
b) K = 3900, Tc = 160, m = 
0.3, α = 1.7 
b) K = 3900, Tc = 290, m = 
0.3, p = 0.85 
c) K = 6700, Tc = 350, p = 
0.85, α = 1.7 
c) K = 6700, Tc = 350, m = 
0.3, α = 1.7 
c) K = 6700, Tc = 350, m = 
0.3, p = 0.85 
d) K = 6700, Tc = 290, p = 
0.85, α = 1.7 
d) K = 6700, Tc = 160, m = 
0.3, α = 1.7 
d) K = 6700, Tc = 290, m = 
0.3, p = 0.85 
e) K = 6700, Tc = 160, p = 
0.85, α = 1.7 
 e) K = 6700, Tc = 160, m = 
0.3, p = 0.85 
Source: The author 
 
Figure 1 represents threshold MFI interest rate as a function of ML interest rate 
m. We observe a concave relationship between r* and m as supported by the 
comparative statics results derived. Initially, with the increase in ML interest rate 
m, there is an increase in threshold MFI interest rate. However, beyond a certain 
level of ML interest rate, the threshold MFI interest rate goes down to keep the 
borrower indifferent in borrowing from two sources and to ensure repayments of 
the borrowed debt.  
 
 
Figure 1. Threshold MFI interest rate as a function of ML interest rate m 
Source: The author 
 
For the given values of K, p and α, a higher transaction cost amount shifts the r* 
curve downwards. This is shown by the graph for case a lying below the graph for 
case b at lower values of K (3900) and graph for case c lying below the graph for 
case a and b. Higher values of K result in higher level of threshold interest rate as 
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compared to the case when K is lower as shown in the graphs for cases c, d and e 
lying above the graphs for cases a and b. 
Figure 2 shows threshold MFI interest rate as a function of probability p.The 
threshold interest rate is positive for sufficiently high p values.A lower transaction 
cost (Tc = 160) combined with higher amount borrowed (K = 6700) leads to 
positive r* when probability of success is at least of the level of 74% (case d), 
while for higher transaction costs (Tc = 350), the corresponding probability level 
got increased up to 79% (case c). 
 
 
Figure 2.Threshold MFI interest rate as a function of probability p 
Source: The author 
 
For lower values of K (3900), the probability level beyond which r* is positive 
increases to 86% in case a and 77% in case b. These results are in consonance with 
Jain and Mansuri (2003) wherein the ML is expected to lend to borrowers to repay 
MFI installments only when they invest in safe projects having higher probability.   
Figures 3 shows the threshold MFI interest rate curve as a function of ability factor 
α. With the increase in transaction cost (keeping K, m and p fixed), ability factor α 
level also increases beyond which threshold r* is positive. 
 
 
Figure 3. Threshold MFI interest rate as a function of ability factor α 
Source: The author 
 
Threshold r* is positive when α crosses the threshold of 1.72 in case a and 1.65 
in case b.If the amount borrowed is high enough (K = 6700), threshold r* is 
positive in the entire range of α considered (1.6, 1.99) in all the three cases (c, d 
and e). 
The graphs in figure 4 show the relation between the threshold MFI interest rate 
and amount borrowed K. We observe that with the lower transaction cost (Tc = 
290), the rate of change in r* with respect to K is smaller (the curve is flatter) as 
compared to the case when transaction cost is high (Tc = 350) keeping rest of the 
parameters at some constant level. This is shown for graphs in cases d, e and f have 
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relatively lower slope than the graphs in cases a, b and c for the given level of m, p 
and α. 
 
Table 2. Parameter combinations considered in simulation results (contd.) 
Figure 4 Figure 5 
Fixed Variable Fixed Variable 
m, α, p, Tc K(3800,6800) m, α, p, K Tc (150, 400) 
a) m = 0.3, p = 0.85, α = 1.7, Tc = 350 a) m = 0.3, p = 0.85, α = 1.7, K = 6700 
b) m = 0.3, p = 0.85, α = 1.8, Tc = 350 b) m = 0.3, p = 0.85, α = 1.8, K = 6700 
c) m = 0.35, p = 0.85, α = 1.7, Tc = 350 c) m = 0.35, p = 0.85, α = 1.7, K = 6700 
d) m = 0.3, p = 0.85, α = 1.7, Tc = 290 d) m = 0.3, p = 0.85, α = 1.7, K = 3900 
e) m = 0.3, p = 0.85, α = 1.8, Tc = 290 e) m = 0.3, p = 0.85, α = 1.8, K = 3900 
f) m = 0.35, p = 0.85, α = 1.7, Tc = 290 f) m = 0.35, p = 0.85, α = 1.7, K = 3900 
Source: The author 
 
 
Figure 4. Threshold MFI interest rate as a function of amount borrowed K 
Source: The author 
 
An increase in ML interest rate or ability factor shifts the r* curve upwards 
keeping rest of the parameters fixed at particular level. This is shown by the graphs 
for cases b and c lying above the graph for case a when Tc is fixed at 350. 
Figure 5 shows the threshold interest rate r* curve with respect to transaction 
cost. With the given level of K and p, a higher ability factor or higher ML interest 
rate shifts the threshold interest rate curve upwards. However, the extent of 
increase in threshold r* is higher in the case of higher ability factor as compared to 
the case of higher ML interest rate. This is shown in the graphs for case b and c 
lying above the graph of case a (assume K = 6700), however graph for case b is 
still above the graph for case c. 
 
 
Figure 5. Threshold MFI interest rate as a function of transaction cost Tc 
Source: The author 
 
Threshold r* is positive for each value of Tc when K is higher at 6700 (cases a, 
b and c). At lower K (3900), r* is positive in the entire range of Tc considered (150, 
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400) when either α is high (1.8) as in case e or m is high (0.35) as in case f. In case 
d, r* is positive if Tc lies in the range of (150, 330). 
 
6. Conclusion 
To conclude, results show that with increased transaction costs, and relative 
lower credit requirement combined with low average productivity (ability factor), 
threshold MFI interest rate and the corresponding MFI profit becomes negative and 
hence becomes unviable to offer group lending contract. This is due to the 
assumption of MFI being profit maximizer. However, if MFI wants to offer such a 
contract, it needs to raise its interest rate above the threshold interest rate. When the 
actual interest rate charged is higher than the threshold MFI interest rate, the 
effective cost of borrowing from ML becomes relatively lower and the objective of 
reducing dependence on ML gets diluted. 
Therefore, to begin with both MFI and ML are equally competent to meet 
borrowers’ credit requirement, but with the inclusion of borrowers’ participation 
constraint, MFI lending becomes feasible only under certain conditions. Results 
show there is higher probability of MFI lending to be feasible when there is relative 
higher credit requirement or higher ability of borrowers to produce returns or lower 
transaction costs of borrowers. The additional transaction cost burden involved in 
MFI borrowing works against the poor borrowers in particular, who are believed to 
have lower ability to produce returns and also have small credit requirement. 
Therefore, from the policy standpoint, these results reiterate the importance of 
reducing transaction costs to enhance borrower welfare as Bhatt & Tang (2001), 
Field & Pande (2008), Laureti (2012) and several other authors have pointed out. 
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Appendix 1 
Deriving optimum MFI interest rate r* (equation 6) and optimum installment 
amount s* (equation 7) 
Lagrange function L is written as: 
 
 
 
2
1 c
2
L 2 s(1 r) 1 (1 p) (K s)(1 r) K
K (1 r)(p 2) (1 m) s(1 r)(p m 1) T
K 2(1 r) s(1 r)(1 m)
        
 
           
        
 
 2 1 2
L
2s 2(2p p )(K s) K(p 2) s(p m 1) 2K s(1 m)
r
 
 

            

 
 2 1 2
L
2(1 r) 2(2p p )(1 r)( 1) (1 r)(p m 1) (1 r)(1 m)
s
 
 

             

 
Putting 
L
0
r



 and 
L
0
s



 
Getting λ1 from both equations, 
   21 2K(p 2) s(p m 1) 2s 2(2p p )(K s) 2K s(1 m)              
 21 2(1 r)(p m 1) 2(1 r) 2(2p p )(1 r) (1 r)(1 m)             or , 
2
1 2(p m 1) 2 2(2p p ) (1 m)          
Equating the two equations for λ1 and solving for λ2, 
 
2
2(p 2) 1 p(1 m)
(p mp)
  
 

 
The Kuhn- Tucker conditions for constrained maximization ensure λ2> 0 for 
repayment feasibility constraint to be binding at the optimum solution. This implies 
p(1+m) > 1.  
Solving for λ1 using λ2 equation yields the following: 
2
1 2(p m 1) 2 2(2p p ) (1 m)          
 2
1
1 p(1 m)
(p m 1) 2 2(2p p ) (1 m).2(p 2)
(p mp)
 
         

 
 
1
2 p(1 m)(2 p) 2
p(1 m)
  
 

 
λ1is Lagrange multiplier for equality constraint, and hence it can take any real 
number. However for constraint to be binding, λ1 should be non-zero which implies 
p(1+m)(2-p) ≠ 2 
Solving for r and s using the following two constraint equations; 
  cK (1 r)(p 2) (1 m) s(1 r)(p m 1) T 0          and 
 K 2(1 r) s(1 r)(1 m) 0       
From 1
st
 equation getting the value of s and putting in 2
nd
 equation, 
  c
1
s(1 r) K (1 r)(p 2) (1 m) T
(p m 1)
         
 
From 2
nd
 equation, 
    c
(1 m)
K 2(1 r) K (1 r)(p 2) (1 m) T 0
(p m 1)

           
 
Since (p+m-1) ≠ 0, therefore, 
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    cK(p m 1) 2(1 r) (1 m) K (1 r)(p 2) (1 m) T 0               
Solving for r, 
cK (p m 1) (1 m)K(1 m) (1 m)T
(1 r)
pK(1 m)
       
 

 
  c(p m 1)K (1 m) (1 m)T
r r*
pK(1 m)
     
 

 
Putting the value of (1+r) in s equation and solving for s yields, 
  c
1
s(1 r) K (1 r)(p 2) (1 m) T
(p m 1)
         
 
c
c
c
K (p m 1) (1 m)K(1 m) (1 m)T
s(p m 1)
pK(1 m)
K (p m 1) (1 m)K(1 m) (1 m)T
K(p 2) K(1 m) T
pK(1 m)
        
   
 
        
    
 
 
c
c
K (p 2) 2K(1 m) 2T
s s* K
K (p m 1) (1 m)K(1 m) (1 m)T
     
   
        
 
Since there are two equations to solve (borrower’s participation constraint and 
repayment feasibility constraint) with two unknowns (r, s), hence the first order 
conditions with constraints on Lagrange multipliers as shown above are sufficient 
conditions for constrained maximization (Kim, n.d.) 
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Appendix 2 
Restrictions on parameters K, α, p, m, Tc (Section 4): 
Following are the restrictions imposed on parameters values to establish r* 0 , 
s* 0 , r* m  , s* K , λ2> 0 and λ1≠0 
From λ2 equation, 
 
2
2(p 2) 1 p(1 m)
(p mp)
  
 

 
Since (p-2) is negative, therefore  1 p(1 m)  has to be negative as well which 
implies,  
p(1+m) > 1          
 (1) 
From the above inequality, we have
(1 p)
m
p

 . For m < 1, it should satisfy (1-
p)/p < 1 which implies p>1/2.  
From λ1 equation, 
 
1
2 p(1 m)(2 p) 2
p(1 m)
  
 

 
For λ1 to be non-zero, it should satisfy, 
p(1 m)(2 p) 2           
 (2) 
From r* >= 0 
  c(p m 1)K (1 m) (1 m)T
r* 0
pK(1 m)
     
 

 
  c(p m 1)K (1 m) (1 m)T       (3) 
From r*<=m 
  c(p m 1)K (1 m) (1 m)T
r* m
pK(1 m)
     
 

    
   
  c(p m 1)K (1 m) mpK(1 m) (1 m)T            
         (4) 
From s*>=0 
c
c
K (p 2) 2K(1 m) 2T
s* K 0
K (p m 1) (1 m)K(1 m) (1 m)T
     
  
        
 
  cK (p 2) 2(1 m) 2T            
  (5) 
The above inequality is established since, the denominator of s* is positive by 
inequality (3) above. 
From s*<=K 
c
c
K (p 2) 2K(1 m) 2T
s* K K
K (p m 1) (1 m)K(1 m) (1 m)T
     
  
        
 
c cK (p 2) 2K(1 m) 2T K (p m 1) (1 m)K(1 m) (1 m)T               
 c(1 m) K K(1 m) T 0       
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  cK (1 m) T          (5ʹ) 
For EUML to be positive, it should satisfy the following 
α> (1+m)         
  (6) 
From inequality (6) and assumption of Tc> 0, inequality (5ʹ) is always satisfied and 
hence superfluous. 
From inequality(5)in this appendix, we have, 
 
c
K (p 2) 2(1 m)
T
2
   
  
Since Tc is assumed to be strictly positive, therefore it must satisfy 
 K (p 2) 2(1 m)
0
2
   
 which implies, 
2(1 m)
(2 p)

 

         
  (7) 
The above parameter restrictions are valid for K, α, m, Tc all strictly positive and 
p (0,1)  
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Appendix 3 
Comparative statics results of r* (Section 4) 
1. 
r
K


 
    c
2
K(p m 1) (1 m) K(p m 1) (1 m) (1 m)Tr 1
K p(1 m) K
           
  
   
 
c
2
r (1 m)T
K p(1 m)K
 

 
 
Therefore, 
r
0
K



if m < 1 and, 
r
0
K



if m > 1 
m< 1 implies p > 1/2 and vice-versa from inequality (1) in Appendix 2 
 
2. 
c
r
T


 
c
r (1 m)
T p(1 m)K
  

 
 
c
r
0
T



if m < 1 and, 
c
r
0
T



if m >1  
m< 1 implies p > 1/2 and vice-versa from inequality (1) in Appendix 2  
 
3. 
r

 
r (p m 1)
p(1 m)
  

 
>0  
This is unambiguously positive because of p(1+m) > 1 , inequality (1) in Appendix 
2 
 
4. 
r
p


 
    c
2
pK (1 m) (p m 1)K (1 m) (1 m)Tr 1
p K(1 m) p
          
  
     
  c
2
(1 m) K (1 m) Tr
p p K(1 m)
      
 
 
The expression   cK (1 m) T     is positive from s<=K condition. Hence the 
sign of partial derivative is dependent upon if (1-m) is positive or negative. 
Therefore, 
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r
0
p



ifm < 1 and  
r
0
p



ifm > 1 
m< 1 implies p > 1/2 and vice-versa from inequality (1) in Appendix 2  
 
5. 
r
m


 
  
 
c
c
2
(1 m) K(p m 1) K (1 m) T
(p m 1)K (1 m) (1 m)Tr 1
m pK (1 m)
         
 
        
  
  
 
 
 
2
c
2
r 1
K (p m 1) K (1 m) K(1 m) 2T
m pK(1 m)

             
 
2
c
2
r 1
2T K(1 m) K (p 2)
m pK(1 m)

        
 
r
0
m



if 2c2T K (2 p) K(1 m)      , and 
r
0
m



if 2c2T K (2 p) K(1 m)      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Turkish Economic Review 
 TER, 3(1), A. Tutlani, p.170-187. 
187 
187 
References 
Aghion, B.A. (1999). On the design of a credit agreement with peer monitoring, Journal of 
Development Economics, 60(1), 79-104. doi. 10.1016/S0304-3878(99)00037-1 
Aghion, B.A., & Gollier, C. (2000). Peer group formation in an adverse selection model, The 
Economic Journal, 110(465): 632-643. doi. 10.1111/1468-0297.00557 
Ahlin, C. (2013). The role of group size in group lending, Working paper, Michigan State University. 
Ahmed, Z.A. (1989). Effective cost of rural loans in Bangladesh, World Development, 17(3), 357-
363. doi. 10.1016/0305-750X(89)90209-X 
Banerjee, A.V., & Duflo, E. (2010). Giving credit where it is due, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
24(3), 61-80. doi. 10.1257/jep.24.3.61 
Besley, T., & Coate, S.  (1995). Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral, Journal of 
Development Economics, 46(1), 1-18. doi. 10.1016/0304-3878(94)00045-E 
Bhatt, N., & Tang, S.Y. (1998). The problem of transaction costs in group-based micro lending: An 
institutional perspective, World Development, 26(4), 623-637. doi. 10.1016/S0305-
750X(98)00007-2 
Bhatt, N., & Tang, S.Y. (2001). Designing group-based microfinance programs: Some theoretical and 
policy considerations, International Journal of Public Administration, 24(10), 1103-1125. doi. 
10.1081/PAD-100105104 
Bose, P. (1998), Formal-informal sector interaction in rural credit markets, Journal of Development 
Economics, 56(2), 265-280. doi. 10.1016/S0304-3878(98)00066-2 
Chung, I. (1995). Market choice and effective demand for credit: Roles of borrower transaction costs 
and rationing constraint, Journal of Economic Development, 20(2), 23-44.  
Dehem,T.,  & Hudon, M. (2013). Microfinance from the clients’ perspective: An empirical enquiry 
into transaction costs in urban and rural India, Oxford Development Studies,  41(1), S117-S132. 
doi. 10.1080/13600818.2013.787057 
Field, E., & Pande, R. (2008). Repayment frequency and default in microfinance: Evidence from 
India, Journal of the European Economic Association, 6(2-3), 501-509. doi. 
10.1162/JEEA.2008.6.2-3.501 
Ghatak, M. (1999). Group lending, local information and peer selection, Journal of Development 
Economics, 60(1), 27-50. doi. 10.1016/S0304-3878(99)00035-8 
Gine, X. (2011). Access to capital in rural Thailand: An estimated model of formal vs. informal 
credit, Journal of Development Economics, 96(1), 16-29. doi. 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2010.07.001 
Jain, S. (1999). Symbiosis vs. crowding-out: The interaction of formal and informal credit markets in 
developing countries, Journal of Development Economics, 59(2), 419-444. doi. 10.1016/S0304-
3878(99)00019-X 
Jain, S., & Mansuri, G. (2003). A little at a time: The use of regularly scheduled repayments in 
microfinance programs, Journal of Development Economics, 72(1), 253-279. doi. 10.1016/S0304-
3878(03)00076-2 
Karduck, S., & Seibel, H.D. (2004). Transaction costs of self-help groups: A study of NABARD’s 
SHG banking programme in India, [accessed October 10, 2015]. 
Kim, N. H. (n.d.), Constrained optimization, 
http://www2.mae.ufl.edu/nkim/eas6939/ConstrainedOpt.pdf, [accessed October 25, 2015]. 
Laureti, C. (2012). Flexibility and payment discipline in microfinance, Manuscript, Belgium: 
Université de Mons and UniversitéLibre de Bruxelles. 
Pal, S. (2002). Household sectoral choice and effective demand for rural credit in India, Applied 
Economics, 34(14), 1743-1755. doi. 10.1080/00036840210121228 
Pradhan, N.C. (2013). Persistence of informal credit in rural India: Evidence from ‘All-India Debt 
and Investment Survey’ and beyond, Working paper, WPS(DEPR)- 05/2013: RBI 
Shankar, S (2007). Transaction costs in group microcredit in India’, Management Decision, 45(8), 
1331-1342. doi. 10.1108/00251740710819069 
Stiglitz, J.E. (1990). Peer monitoring and credit markets, The World Bank Economic Review, 4(3), 
351-366. 
 
Copyrights 
Copyright for this article is retained by the author(s), with first publication rights granted to 
the journal. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the 
Creative Commons Attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0). 
 
